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Double Jeopardy and Federalism
The author condemns the present state of the law which
allows the trial of a defendant in both state and federal
court on charges arising from the same conduct. Mr.
Fisher analyses the policies behind the rule and the
rationales available to support it. He also discusses a
precedent for changing the law and proposes a legislative
solution.
Walter T. Fisher*
I.
When an accused person has been tried and acquitted, he
cannot normally be taken to court again for the same thing.
Even if the prosecuting officer has overwhelming reasons to believe
that a mistake has been made by the jury, he cannot have a sec-
ond try; the accused is protected by the deeply important prin-
ciple of finality that a person cannot be put in double jeopardy.
Does this prevent retrial in a federal court of a Collie Leroy
Wilkins or a Thomas L. Coleman who were acquitted by an Ala-
bama state court for killing civil rights demonstrators Viola
Liuzzo and Jonathan Daniels?' Does it protect persons such as
those acquitted by a Georgia state court of the murder of Negro
educator Lemuel A. Penn?2 Maybe it does and maybe it doesn't.
For many years the Supreme Court has made an exception to
the double jeopardy rule when one of the trials was in a state
court and the other in a federal court.s This exception was con-
firmed in 1959 in Bartkus v. Illinois4 and Abbate 'v. United States.5
Because under our federal system the states and the federal gov-
ernment are separate sovereignties, the Court reasoned,6 each is
free to prosecute regardless of what the other has done. However,
the Court did not regard a second prosecution as a desirable thing
*Member of the Illinois Bar
1. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 80, 1965, p. 82, col. 5, p. 8, col. 1, 5.
2. United States v. Guest, 86 Sup. Ct. 1170 (1966).
S. See, e.g., United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
4. 859 U.S. 121 (1959).
5. 859 U.S. 187 (1959).
6. 359 U.S. at 188.
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for the states or the nation to do,7 but as a weapon which must be
available to protect American federalism.
A third of the states have passed statutes forbidding prose-
cutors to retry a man already acquitted or convicted by the federal
government for the same criminal act.s Similarly, acts of Congress
prevent federal prosecutions following a few kinds of state trials,
for example, for stealing from interstate carriers,9 and immediately
following Bartkus and Abbate the Attorney General instructed
all United States attorneys not to bring reprosecutions except in
special cases after obtaining his permission.' 0
An indication that the Supreme Court may make this policy
mandatory on the federal government and the two-thirds of the
states that still permit state-nation double jeopardy came in June
1964 in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission." This case decided,
in effect, that if a man is protected against the use by a state court
of his self-incriminating testimony, it cannot be used against him
by the federal government - in short, that a state and the federal
government must not gang up and do together what each is for-
bidden by the Constitution to do alone. Since neither state nor
federal government can by itself put a man in double jeopardy,'2
Murphy should also prevent double jeopardy by crossruff.
But the problem of how to protect federal power would remain.
It would be intolerable that acquittal (or conviction with a small
fine) by a state court be available as an immunity bath to free a
man from trial in a federal court for a federal crime. That result
would violate the basic principle of federal supremacy over the
states. For example, if a would-be voter is beaten to death by the
sheriff to prevent him from voting, acquittal of murder by a state
court ought not protect the sheriff from federal prosecution for
violating the victim's civil rights' If double jeopardy prevents
7. Even Justice Frankfurter in adopting it wept like the Walrus, saying
that it was a result "with which a court is in little sympathy." Ibid.
8. See AmtsxA STAT. § 1220.OO (1962); Arm. STAT. ANN. § 48-1224.1
(1965); ILL. Rzv. STAT. ch. 88 § 3-4 (1961); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-259 (1960);
statutes cited in 41 ImNN. L. REv. 534, 539 n.31 (1960).
9. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 659, 660, 1992, 2117 (1964).
10. See Petite v. United States, 861 U.S. 529, 531 (1960).
11. 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
12. See People v. LoCicero, 14 N.Y.2d 374, 378, 200 N.E.d 622, 624, 251
N.Y.S.2d 958, 956 (1964).
13. For purposes of argument this article will assume that § 12(a) of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1971, 1973-7Sp
(Supp. 1965), will be amended so as to punish assault or murder to deprive
a person of his right to vote, etc. as severely as assault and murder are pun-
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federal retrial, as I believe it ought, some other way must be
found to safeguard federal supremacy. I shall try to point one out.
CONCURRENT JUISDICTION
Except for concurrent jurisdiction our problem would not arise.
Concurrent jurisdiction exists where the federal government has
power over a class of cases but permits the states to exercise power
also; for example, state and nation each has the unquestioned
power to prosecute the same man for the same robbery of a na-
tional bank. This is a prime feature of American federalism. It is
unlike Canadian federalism, where crimes are classified as either
Dominion or provincial.U The power of Congress to oust the states
and preempt the field, a power essential to federal supremacy, has
been exercised over many classes of cases. If the states are ousted
there can be only one trial - a federal trial.15 Where jurisdiction
remains concurrent, the mere existence of the unexercised pre-
emption power apparently is sufficient to satisfy the requirements
of federal supremacy.' Nonexercise of the preemption power has
the advantage of respecting the balance between the nation and
the sovereign states. However, the double jeopardy problem is
an accompanying disadvantage.
The problem has been viewed - mistakenly, I believe - as
part of the inevitable clash where two unyielding sovereignties
have overlapping powers. The clash really would be inevitable if
the sovereignties were equally powerful. But in a field of concur-
ished by the state in which the crime took place. This could be done either
by a provision analogous to the Assimilative Crimes Act, 62 Stat. 686 (1948),
18 U.S&C. § 18 (1964), or to that in the Bank Robbery Act, 62 Stat. 796 (1948),
18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1964). I also assume the constitutionality of § 12(a), but if
it is not constitutional the double jeopardy problem will not, of course, arise
under it. See also President's State of the Union Message, 112 CoNG. Rc. 129,
180 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1966).
14. So in Canada criminal cases of overlapping sovereignties do not often
arise. The text book case is shooting a man across a provincial boundary or
across the international boundary with the United States. See Palmer, Federal-
ism and Uniformity of Laws: The Canadian Experience, SO LAw & CoNTrmT.
PROB. 251 (1965).
15. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), where avoidance of
double jeopardy partly motivated the decision.
16. See the concurrence of Mr. Justice White in Murphy where he said:
"federal pre-emption of areas of crime control traditionally reserved to the
States has been relatively unknown and this area has been said to be at the
core of the continuing viability of the States in our federal system." 378 U.S.
at 96.
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rent jurisdiction the sovereignties are not equally powerful. There
the nation is all powerful. It could take over the whole field.
Therefore it could take over part of the field, or make a partial
and limited preemption.
SoL TiON THROUGH PRE PTION
Since the Supreme Court has, I believe, expressed in Murphy
a principle which would prevent a state from retrying a man al-
ready acquitted or convicted in a federal court, no problem exists
where federal authorities get hold of the accused man first. Under
the Murphy rationale they try him in a federal court once and
for all. Federal supremacy is maintained and double jeopardy is
prevented.
But the federal authorities should not be forced to a hasty
election between getting hold of the man first and losing the
right to prosecute. An early election might be feasible in the case
of relatively infrequent and widely publicized crimes like bank
robbery and kidnapping where a race to court can be prevented
by a federal statute prohibiting state prosecution for specified
crimes until a given number of days after notice to the appropriate
United States attorney. During this grace period the man would
be available for federal prosecution in lieu of state prosecution' 7
Similarly, the statute making assassination of the President a
federal crime18 provides, without wholly preempting the field,
that state jurisdiction is suspended by the mere assertion of
jurisdiction by the federal authorities. Since the assassination of
the President would be instantly known, this provision would
seem to be a practical way of protecting federal supremacy. But
with ordinary homicides and assaults it would seem wholly im-
practical to inform the federal authorities of every state case which
might later turn out to have federal aspects.'9
My solution is to put the burden of election on the accused.
Let Congress provide that any state defendant, our sheriff for
example, arrested in Alabama for an assault or homicide, may
avoid the double jeopardy of subsequent federal prosecution (for
depriving the victim of his federal constitutional rights) by
electing to have a federal trial instead of a state trial 0 The case
17. This analysis was suggested in Note, 53 Nw. UI,. Rnv. 521, 527 (1958).
18. 79 Stat. 580 (1965), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1751 (Supp. 1965).
19. Justice Brennan pointed this out in Abbate. 359 U.S. at 195.
20. Cf. the accused's right to -be tried by the federal court instead of by a
U.S. Commissioner. See 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) (1964).
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would be stayed in the state court pending a decision by the
Department of Justice on whether it wanted to take the case. Of
course, the Department ought to be given the right to decline to
prosecute. If the federal authorities accept the election and obtain
an indictment within a specified number of days, the state prose-
cution would be permanently quashed, a federal trial would take
place, and the result of that trial would be a final disposition of
the affair. The transfer of prosecution would not be "removal" as
contemplated in existing removal statutes and the state's attorney
would not prosecute in the federal court. A new, federal, case
would be started for conduct constituting a federal offense. If the
case were declined, it would be returned to the state court. The
ensuing state trial would be a final disposition of the matter. The
federal government's declining to prosecute would prevent trying
the defendant again in a federal court for the same conduct.
If the accused chose a state prosecution, the statute would
allow another trial on the federal issues in a federal court irrespec-
tive of the decision in the state court. He would be foreclosed
from contending that the subsequent federal trial was double
jeopardy.
Forcing the accused to such an election would be unconstitu-
tional if he has a constitutional right to be tried in a state court,
for the retention of one constitutional right cannot be made
contingent on relinquishing another.2 ' But there is no such right.
The state's police power would not prevent Congress from provid-
ing, for example, that persons accused of robbing national banks
be tried exclusively in the federal courts. Since Congress has the
power to take away completely the right to be tried by the state
in an area of concurrent jurisdiction, Congress could likewise make
offenses under the federal Civil Rights Act exclusively triable in
the federal courts, thereby preventing state action for all assaults
and murders involving deprivation of constitutional civil rights.
But it is not necessary or desirable to go so far. Such an
extreme preemption would be highly undesirable, upsetting the
state-federal balance and endangering the viability of American
federalism. I suggest no such thing. I think Congress should
preempt only to the extent necessary to protect its jurisdiction in
a limited class of cases - those cases where state trial may not
adequately protect federal rights and where, if there is to be only
one trial (as required by the double jeopardy principle) the De-
21. Of. Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake, 74 YAI L.J. 606, 613-17 (1965)
(doctrine of unconstitutional conditions).
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partment of Justice should be given the power to make it a federal
trial.
If the federal government could compel transfer to the federal
court in these circumstances, our Alabama sheriff could not com-
plain of being exposed to the danger of retrial in a federal court
for the same conduct of which he may have been acquitted (or
convicted) in Alabama. Since trial in Alabama is an option held
by grace of Congress, and something to which he is not constitu-
tionally entitled, he could not complain that the option is re-
stricted and not as large as he would like. He could avoid the
issue and double jeopardy, too, by opting for the federal trial
which Congress could have imposed upon him.
As between a state and the federal government this proposal
would not affect the present practice of initiating criminal pro-
ceedings. The state would continue to initiate proceedings under
its police power as is presently the practice. It would then try the
defendant unless he made timely exercise of his proposed right
of transfer. The Department of Justice could continue to follow
its policy of deferring to the state in certain situations. The De-
partment would take cases where state prosecution was deemed
likely to be inefficient or insincere and where for other reasons a
federal prosecution was deemed appropriate.
It would seem constitutionally necessary to permit the defend-
ant to challenge federal jurisdiction of the subject matter irre-
spective of his having requested the transfer. Coercing him into
federal court, unless federal jurisdiction actually exists, would be
improper. But, with certain exceptions, both he and the Govern-
ment ought to be compelled to raise the issue before trial, contrary
to the present rule permitting questions of subject-matter juris-
diction to be raised at any stage. Disposing of the federal juris-
diction issue at the outset of the trial is particularly desirable in
double jeopardy cases. If trial takes place before the question of
jurisdiction is settled, faithfulness to the double jeopardy principle
would militate against a second trial by the state. However, under
present law there would be a second, state, trial for if the federal
jurisdictional issue cannot be decided until after trial, and if it
is decided against jurisdiction, there is no way to protect the
accused against the jeopardy of a state trial. Present thinking
22. The American Law Institute's committee believes this change would
be constitutional. A.L., STUDY Or THE DvIsIoN oF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE A FEERAL CouRTs 106-10 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, April 19,
1965).
[Vol. 50:607
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
places the policy against double jeopardy second to the empty
rationale that the accused had not been in jeopardy because there
was no federal jurisdiction.
If jurisdiction cannot be determined before trial it seems to
me that the double jeopardy principle is so important that if the
federal government has carried a case through trial but finally
fails to sustain its claim of jurisdiction, a state- and more
broadly, our American federalism -ought to take the risk of
letting the accused escape. Here federal supremacy is not involved.
If on further study the particular proposal made in this article
should turn out to be objectionable, I believe some other use of
federal preemption will provide the path to a sound solution.
There must be some way within the framework of federal su-
premacy to eliminate the constitutional scandal of double jeop-
ardy. There must be some way by which the federal government
can protect the finality of any judgment rendered by a federal
court or by a state court in a federal fleldVs
Ii.
A proposal such as mine has the further merit of enabling the
courts to avoid troublesome constitutional issues that are likely
to arise. This is because the solution is a legislative one giving the
accused a higher standard of protection than the bare constitu-
tional minimum available.2 4 Under such a statute those constitu-
tional issues would not be reached.
23. As Justice Black said in dissent, "If Congress has power to make
certain conduct a federal crime, it also has the power to protect the national
interest .... [F]ederal laws can easily be safeguarded without requiring
defendants to undergo double prosecutions." 359 U.S. at 202 n.2.
24. The federal government has gone a short distance along the legislative
route by forbidding federal retrials for train wrecking and stealing from inter-
state carriers. 18 U.S.C. ff 1992, 659, 660, 2117 (1964). And the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 provides that acquittal or conviction shall bar a proceeding for
criminal contempt based on the same conduct and vice versa. 78 Stat. 268, 42
U.S.C. § 2000 h-i (1964), overrning United States v. M3rra, 220 F. Supp. 361
(S.D.N.Y. 1963). Legislative escape from the double jeopardy maze is advo-
cated by Professor Wechsler, Wechsler, Foreword to Winter 1960 U. krm. L.
FoRum. See generally Note, 65 YAIz L.J. 339 (1956). Legislative provision
against interjurisdictional double jeopardy has been enacted by the Field Code
states. See, e.g., People v. LoCicero, 14 N.Y.2d 374, 200 N.E.2d 622, 251
N.Y.S.2d 953 (1964). Almost all the states have enacted the provision of the
Uniform Narcotic Drug Act barring state prosecution of persons acquitted or
convicted under the federal narcotic laws for the same conduct. UNwonm
NARCOTIc DRUG AcT § 21.
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THE INTRuDiNG CoNsTrUTox
A digression on the inflated role that the Constitution has been
permitted to assume in the law of double jeopardy may make the
discussion clearer.
The canon that constitutional issues ought not to be decided
unless they are necessarily reached is too often forgotten in our
fascination with all constitutional problems. "At the first sound
of a new argument over the United States Constitution and its
interpretation the hearts of Americans leap with a fearful joy....
Like King Harry's men before Harileur, they stand like grey-
hounds in the slips.. .," quoted Justice Frankfurter. 5 But Justice
Franldurter himself joined his colleagues and his predecessors in
overlooking the canon in double jeopardy cases. 6
We too often forget that double jeopardy is not only a con-
stitutional matter but a matter of common law, statute, or statu-
tory interpretation. Even if there were no constitutional prohibi-
tion against trying a man repeatedly for the same offense, it
would be prevented by statute (as in Massachusetts) 27 or by the
common law defense of double jeopardy (as in Maryland28 and
North Carolina?'). Thus, each statutory offense is to be construed
as subject to the double jeopardy principle; and rightly so, because
the legislature could hardly have intended that a person be tried
twice for the same conduct under the same provision of the penal
code. The same intention can be safely imputed to the legislatures
of all the states, and to Congress too. That is the reason why a
man cannot be tried twice under the identical statute, not because
it is unconstitutional. Thus the constitutional issue need not be
reached.
Distinguishing between constitutional and unconstitutional
double jeopardy would be irrelevant if there were only one stand-
ard of double jeopardy. Then every determination of the scope of
double jeopardy under the common law or statutes would be a
25. Quoted from The Economist (London), May 10, 1952, p. 370, in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Steel Co. v. Sawyer, 348 U.S. 579, 594 (1952).
26. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); W.T. Fisher, Double
Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and the Intruding Constitution, 28 U. CHx. L.
REV. 591, 600-02 (1961).
27. See Commonwealth v. Burke, 342 Mass. 144, 172 N.E.2d 605 (1961).
28. Wampler v. Warden, 231 Md. 639, 191 A.2d 594 (1968).
29. State v. Birckhead, 256 N.C. 494, 124 S.E.2d 838 (1962) (impliedly in
the North Carolina constitution). Vermont and Connecticut, the two other
states without constitutional provision against double jeopardy but with
some statutory recognition of it, likewise regard themselves as bound by the
common law. State v. Vincent, 25 Conn. Supp. 96, 197 A.2d 79, 81 (1961);
State v. Woodmansee, 124 Vt. 387, 205 A.2d 407 (1964).
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determination of its scope under the Constitution. But there are
at least two kinds of double jeopardy: that which is merely for-
bidden by the common law as altered from time to time by
statute (which might be called "fringe"30 double jeopardy) and
that which is so shocking to our standards of ordered liberty that
it violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
(which might be called "basic" double jeopardy).' In Palo 'v.
ConneCticut12 it was pointed out that double jeopardy under the
fifth amendment may be different from that under the fourteenth
and that permitting a state to appeal in a criminal case was not
so basic as to be unconstitutional 3 The difference, however, has
been overlooked by many judges obsessed by the notion that
double jeopardy is always a constitutional precept and hence
always the same precept. This view that double jeopardy is a
monolithic concept for all purposes leads to a common misappre-
hension that when Palko decided that the fourteenth amendment
did not apply to a case of fringe double jeopardy it meant that
the fourteenth amendment did not apply to double jeopardy at
all and that the states would be free to engage in the basic double
jeopardy of repeated trials under substantially identical sections
of a state's penal code -or even under the same section.
The present discussion is not concerned with the particular
content of basic double jeopardy under the fourteenth amend-
ment, i.e., whether Palko drew the line in the right place in per-
mitting appeal by the prosecution, thus classifying it merely as
fringe double jeopardy like such matters as when a judge, without
sufficient justification, declares a mistrial after some evidence has
been taken34 Nor are we concerned with the particular content of
fifth amendment double jeopardy, nor where its lines are to be
drawn between fringe and basic double jeopardy, if they ever are,
as I believe they ought. Certainly government appeal of an ac-
quittal is forbidden by the fifth amendmentY5
S0. The term "fringe area" is applied to double jeopardy in 1959 U. ILL. L.
FoRnu 677, 678 n.10.
31. In United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1965),
it is called the "basic core" of double jeopardy.
32. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
33. Id. at 328; see United States ex rel. Hetenyl v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844
(2d Cir. 1965).
34. See Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961); Note, 77 1ARv. L. REV.
1272 (1964); 36 N.Y.U,. Rnv. 730 (1961).
35. Even if authorized by an amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1964). But
future thinking may change. See Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trial&
and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1960).
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My concern is with the either-constitutional-or-nothing ap-
proach, which produces the unfortunate result of freezing every
fringe feature of double jeopardy into the Constitution, either into
the fifth amendment as the Court has often said it is doing, or
info the fourteenth by possible future reversal of Pako. For exam-
ple, in a recent five-to-four decision none of the Justices questioned
the Court's statement that premature discontinuance of a trial
"presents a question under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.""6 It apparently did not occur to them that
the constitutional question could have been avoided in the ab-
sence of an act of Congress expressly authorizing retrial under
those circumstances, and that the question could be much better
decided by interpreting federal penal statutes as embodying the
common law defense of double jeopardy or by exercising the su-
pervisory jurisdiction of the Court.3 7 The use of either of these
nonconstitutional approaches would have the advantage of free-
ing the Court from the dilemma of depriving the accused of some
minor feature of common law double jeopardy protection or of
freezing a minor matter into the Constitution. It would have the
further advantage of giving Congress some latitude in regulating
relatively minor features of double jeopardy in the manner recom-
mended for state legislation by the American Law Institute.!"
Similar advantages would be available to the states in interpreting
their own constitutions.
THE "SPARATE GIST" THEORY
Even if, as I believe it will, the Court chooses to apply the rea-
soning of Murphy v. Waterfront to prevent basic double jeopardy
between state and nation, it might.still catch our southern sheriff
by turning to the "separate gist" theory. This theory is based
on something the Court said fifty years agos9 and has been ignored
during the period of obsession with the federal-state dichotomy.
As counsel for Bartkus I failed to tempt the Court with this
method of distinguishing civil rights cases. In Abbate the Govern-
ment argued this separate gist theory as an alternative ground.
The Court did not adopt the theory but Justice Brennan thought
36. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
37. See the reasoning of Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in
Murphy. 378 U.S. at 91. See also Note, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1272, 1289 (1964).
38. Of. Monur, PsNAL CODE § 1.08(4) (1962), which would give the states
the same latitude.
39. Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.. 388, 342 (1911); see Cramton,
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 26 U. Cm. L. Ruv. 85, 101 (1958).
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it so dangerous that he wrote a separate opinion condemning it.40
Though it may be constitutional it would involve continually
troublesome constitutional or other issues that could be avoided by
my suggested preemption legislation. It is an undesirable solution.
Here it is, applied to our example: The crime of violating a
person's civil rights has a different gist, purpose or gravamen41
from the crime of murder, and so the double jeopardy principle
does not apply. The reasoning goes that the state and federal
offenses are not the same; that, while they deal with the same
conduct of the accused, one protects the citizen against homicide
in general and the other protects against interference with his
federal constitutional rights. Since each statute has its own pur-
pose and policy and protects a different social interest from the
other, it would follow that conviction or acquittal under one
ought not to bar a prosecution under the other. Furthermore, the
argument runs, the crime of robbing a federally-insured bank and
the state crime of bank robbery have the same gist because they
do not involve different social interests. Thus the bank robber
would be protected from a second prosecution while the sheriff
would not. This sets the task of dividing federal crimes into two
classes, those which have the same gist as the corresponding state
crime and those which do not.
The validity of the argument is to be tested not only by the
practical difficulty of classifying the crimes but also by the scope
of the double jeopardy principle. Without stopping to discuss the
reasons behind the principle 2 it may be summarized as meaning
that a defendant shall not be subjected to a second prosecution
for what is essentially and practically the same thing as the
first. The point is that in both trials our Alabamian would be tried
for what is essentially and practically the same homicide, though
state and nation have different purposes. Every federal crime has
to some extent a different purpose from the similar state crime;
otherwise there would be no basis for federal jurisdiction. Rob-
40. 359 U.S. at 196. Unimpressed by Justice Brennan's argument, the
U.S. District Court in Maryland upheld a federal retrial after state acquittal
for the same conduct "where the interests sought to be protected by each
sovereign are different." United States v. Sutton, 245 F. Supp. 357, 862 (D.
Md. 1965).
41. "Gravamen" is the word used in Prince v. United States, 852 U.S.
322, 328 (1957), in construing two statutes as not so different as to authorize
double punishment.
42. See Bator, Finality in Cridnal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. Rv. 441, 451-52, 506 (1963); W. T. Fisher,
supra note 26, at 592-94; Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 85.
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bery of a national bank, for example, has been made a federal
crime partly in order to protect the national banking system, even
though in passing the statute Congress may, as is indicated by the
legislative history, have had no wish to protect national banks
more than state banks, but only to make the federal courts and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation available to combat bank rob-
beries.43 Of course the truth is that there is no essential difference
between federal and state bank robbery or between federal and
state murder and assault. In each case state and nation are trying
to stop the robbery, murder or assault. Congress simply feels that
for one reason or another the state government sometimes does
an inadequate job and that the federal government can do it
better.44 So it uses the federal aspect as a jurisdictional basis for
bringing the aid of federal forces in protecting the same interests
as those protected by state law45 Even though the federal interest
must always be there to justify the federal legislation, its presence
is irrelevant to the policy which prohibits double jeopardy. Every
reason underlying the double jeopardy principle is fully applicable
to prevent federal retrials for pairs of crimes based on the same
conduct of the accused. There is no clear way of dividing the
paired crimes into two classes, one where the gist is the same and
one where it is different.
The separate gist theory has no other purpose than to protect
federal supremacy. The protection would apply only to that
limited class of cases where the gists are different, as in the his-
torical example of liquor prohibition and the current example of
civil rights. Other protection must be found where the state and
federal crimes have the same gist, e.g., bank robbery. True, where
the gist is the same there are unlikely to be many occasions when
a federal trial will be needed to maintain supremacy. Everybody,
Alabamians included, is against bank robbery. In that field there
is the usual excellent administrative cooperation between state
43. See H.R. Esp. No. 1461, 78d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
44. For the reasons -see HART & WE=HSE, THE FnEmuL CouRTs AND
THE FEmERAuL SysTEm 1096-97 (1953).
45. "Courts find themselves talking nonsense like the often repeated
declaration that the use of the mails is the 'gist' of the offense of mail fraud
when all that is meant is that this federal jurisdictional element must, of
course, be alleged and proved." Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and
Prosecutors' Discretion, 13 LAw & CONTKmP. PROB. 64, 79 (1948). Justice
White concurring in Murphy, stated: "National enactments which touch upon
these areas are not designed directly to suppress activities illegal under
state law but to assist state enforcement agencies in the administration of
their own statutes." 378 U.S. at 96 n.3.
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and federal officers both in investigation and as to selection of
the appropriate court for trial. But the climate of local opinion
may change in some field. Or nationwide public indignation may
arise against a particular type of crime accompanied by greater
public confidence in the efficiency of federal law enforcement. 6
It is likely advisable for the federal government to be ready to
enter such a situation. Restricting federal supremacy to those situ-
ations where the state and federal statutes have separate gists
might be dangerous. The Court, except for its reasoning in that
fifty year old case, 47 has, rightly or wrongly, refused to make the
attempt. Retrial has been permitted not because federal juris-
diction makes the federal crime different from the state crime,
separate gist or no, but because the double jeopardy principle
itself was tossed aside as an obstacle to the predominant claims
of the federal system.48 This is still double jeopardy, just as
robbery by a diplomat is still robbery though court action is
thwarted by a competing policy.
It is my thesis that tossing double jeopardy aside is not neces-
sary to federal supremacy, which can be fully protected by pre-
emption legislation along the lines of my suggestion.
CONCLUSION
My view of federal-state double jeopardy under the present
confused state of the law may be summarized as follows:
(1) The Constitution (under the frfth and fourteenth amend-
ments, respectively) prevents both the nation and the states from
engaging in basic double jeopardy. This is a reversal of a long
history, including Bartkus and Abbate. But it does not impair
federal supremacy, because Congress remains free to preempt a
federal field to the extent necessary to bar a prior state trial.
(2) As far as the federal constitution (i.e., the fourteenth
amendment) is concerned, the states are free to engage in fringe
double jeopardy. Any protection in the state courts against these
relatively minor features must be left to the states under the
Pailko rule. It is to be hoped that the states will, as far as possible,
do this under the common law or by legislation rather than by
freezing these minor features into their own constitutions by
judicial interpretation.
(3) Fringe double jeopardy is forbidden to the federal courts.
46. See HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. "upra note 44, at 1097.
47. Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
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The Supreme Court has usually felt that the reason for this was
the fifth amendment, but I hope I have shown that the constitu-
tional question is not necessarily reached. Similarly, it is my view
that the holdings in federal cases involving double jeopardy can
best be rested on the common law or the supervisory jurisdiction
of the Court. The constitutional question ought not arise until
Congress passes a statute expressly authorizing duplicate prose-
cutions in some situations that the Court finds to involve either
(a) basic double jeopardy or (b) fringe double jeopardy of so
serious a nature or so offensive to deeply ingrained historical prin-
ciples that it must be deemed part of the constitutional double
jeopardy forbidden by the fifth amendment (even though not of
the extreme kind forbidden by the fourteenth). But, under Mur-
phy, using either the common law or the fifth amendment, the
Court ought to prohibit a federal prosecution, for the same con-
duct, under a federal statute having a different gist from the state
statute. This would be a reversal of Abbate, but here, too, it would
not impair the power of Congress to bar a prior state trial by pre-
empting the field to the extent necessary.
What I have said about the present law is filled with doubts.
Many of them involve serious constitutional issues, some of which
could best be postponed indefinitely, and some, it is to be hoped,
forever. The best way to accomplish this would seem to be by some
such legislation as that suggested in this article.
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